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ABSTrACT This paper analyses Raúl Prebisch’s lesser-known contributions to economic theory, 
related to the business cycle and heavily informed by the Argentine experience. His views 
of the cycle emphasize the common nature of the cycle in the centre and the periphery 
as one unified phenomenon. While his rejection of orthodoxy is less than complete, 
some elements of what would become a more Keynesian position are developed. In 
particular, there is a preoccupation with the management of the balance of payments 
and the need for capital controls as a macroeconomic management tool, well before 
Keynes and White’s plans led to the Bretton Woods agreement. In the process it is clear 
that Prebisch developed several ideas that are still relevant for understanding cyclical 
fluctuations in the periphery and that he became more concerned with the ability to take 
advantage of cyclical booms to maintain sustained economic growth.
KEYwOrDS  Raúl Prebisch, economics, business cycles, <money, monetary policy, economic growth, Argentina
JEL CLASSiFiCATiON B31, E32, E65
AUTHOrS  Esteban Pérez Caldentey, Economic Affairs Officer, Financing for Development Division (eclac). 
esteban.perez@eclac.org
 Matías Vernengo, Chief Research Officer, Central Bank of Argentina. vernengo@economics.utah.edu
8POrTrAiT OF THE ECONOmiST AS A YOUNG mAN: rAúL PrEBiSCH’S EvOLviNG viEwS ON THE BUSiNESS  
CyCLE And monEy, 1919-1949  •  EstEbAn PéREz CALdEntEy And mAtíAs VERnEngo
C E P A L  R E V I E W  1 0 6  •  A P R I L  2 0 1 2
Raúl Prebisch (1901-1986) is mostly known for his 
extensive analysis and diagnosis of the development 
problem of Latin America, which he set out in full 
in The Economic Development of Latin America and 
its Principal Problems (1950), also known as the 
Prebisch manifesto, and in Growth, Disequilibrium and 
Disparities: Interpretation of the Process of Economic 
Development (1949). Another major concern, expressed 
in previous writings and more particularly during the 
period 1919-1949, was business cycle fluctuations and 
their relationship to money and finance. To a great extent, 
this concern was a direct result of his experience with 
the management of the Argentine economy.
Prebisch’s interest in the business cycle was inspired 
by the frequent and severe fluctuations experienced by 
the Argentine economy in both the nineteenth and the 
twentieth centuries. While the episodes he analyses are 
very specific to their particular historical context, he 
argued that they were, for the most part, examples of a 
more generic type of cycle, a “boom and bust cycle.” 
According to Prebisch, cycles were “natural,” “recurrent” 
and inevitable facts of economic life. Moreover, he 
argued that the cycle phases were related (the sharpness 
of the contractionary phase was directly related to the 
excesses of the expansionary phase). 
Initially, Prebisch held a monetary view of the 
business cycle, where financial flows played a crucial 
role as a triggering factor. In his analysis of the cycle 
he highlighted the role of expectations and speculation 
in ways that are reminiscent of the modern analyses of 
financial crises that were typical of the Cambridge and 
Scandinavian schools of the time.1 Eventually, under 
the influence of the Great Depression he assigned a 
more prominent place to exports and external demand. 
This led him to introduce an antecedent to the Prebisch-
Singer declining terms-of-trade hypothesis. At the same 
time, notwithstanding his disagreement with Keynes’s 
savings-investment process in The General Theory of 
Employment, Investment and Money (1936), he provided 
an early development of Harrod’s foreign trade multiplier, 
which highlighted the balance-of-payments constraint 
to economic growth in developing countries.2
A key component of his analysis of the cycle was 
to devise a policy to smooth out “booms” and “busts.” 
Prebisch thought that the creation of a central bank could 
indeed perform this task. These views not only led him 
to play an instrumental role in the creation of the Central 
Bank of Argentina but also to introduce and recommend 
countercyclical economic policy actions including the 
undertaking of public works and infrastructure, the 
financing of industry, and the introduction of foreign 
exchange and capital controls, a discussion that preceded 
Keynes and White’s defense of capital controls at Bretton 
Woods. As part of his policy recommendations and in 
consonance with current-day views, Prebisch also favoured 
international reserve accumulation as a precautionary 
measure to weather downturns.
Eventually, after having concentrated mainly on 
devising policies for mitigating economic contractions 
in Argentina, Prebisch’s attention turned, during and 
following the Second World War, towards taking advantage 
of cycle upswings to achieve improved and sustained 
rates of growth. This led him to focus on the problem of 
economic growth in general, as he termed it, highlighting 
and underscoring the need to capture the domestic policy 
1  Hawtrey and other Cambridge economists, like Keynes, emphasized 
monetary shocks, in contrast to Wicksell and Schumpeter, who 
emphasized the role of real shocks as central for the trade cycle. 
Hawtrey worked at the United Kingdom Treasury but was educated 
at Cambridge and was seen as a peripheral member of the same 
school of thought. On Cambridge monetary ideas at that time, see 
Bridel (1987). On the role of the Scandinavian, or Swedish, school, 
in particular its preoccupation with expectations and macroeconomic 
dynamics, see Leijonhufvud (1981).
2  This suggests, in fact, that Toye and Toye’s (2003) suggestion that 
Singer first formulated the thought in his anonymous United Nations 
study in 1949 and that it was then used and quoted by Prebisch when the 
latter wrote his development manifesto the following year is incorrect.
 The authors are an Economic Affairs Officer at the Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (eclac) in Santiago, 
and the Chief Research Officer at the Central Bank of Argentina. The 
opinions here expressed are the authors’ own and do not necessarily 
coincide with those of the institutions with which they are affiliated. 
The authors wish to express their gratitude to Ricardo Bielschowsky, 
Noemí Brenta, Benjamin Hopenhayn, Emiliano Libman, Julio López, 
Juan Carlos Moreno-Brid, Mario Rapoport, Osvaldo Sunkel and 
Anthony P. Thirlwall for their valuable comments on an earlier version. 
A preliminary version was presented at the Center of Economics and 
Finance for the Development of Argentina (cefid-ar). All the English 
translations of sources in French and in Spanish, including Prebisch’s 
works (Prebisch, 1991 and 1993) are by the authors of this paper. 
Throughout the text Prebisch’s works are cited with the respective 
volume and page numbers.
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space and autonomy required to isolate, as much as 
possible, the national economy from the fluctuations of 
developed countries. Central to this viewpoint was the 
substitution of domestic production for foreign production 
through the promotion of local industry.
These ideas, jointly with the recognition that the 
observed economic cycle was part of a single global 
process rather than a country-specific phenomenon, 
whose impulses triggered by the cyclical centre (first 
the United Kingdom and then the United States) were 
transmitted to the countries of the periphery (including 
Latin America), paved the way for the development of his 
later conceptual framework set out in the development 
manifesto and in Growth, Disequilibrium and Disparities.3
3 The Economic Development of Latin America and its Principal 
Problems, or the Prebisch manifesto, was published in 1949 as an 
introduction to the 1948 Economic Survey of Latin America and also 
appeared in the same year in Revista Brasileira de Economia, No. 3, 
pp. 47-109 and in El Trimestre Económico 16(63); 347-431, July-
September and in 1950, in Revista de Ciencias Económicas, Buenos 
Aires, year 38, Series III, No. 22, March-April. In 1962 it appeared in 
the Boletín Económico de la América Latina, vol. 3, No. 1, February 
1962. “Growth, Disequilibrium and Disparities: Interpretation of the 
Economic Development Process” constituted the first part of the 1949 
Economic Survey of Latin America. 
This paper traces, analyses and critically interprets 
Prebisch’s evolving views on the cycle and on money 
and highlights their current relevance in the face of 
changing economic circumstances. Most of the focus 
is placed on the cycles prior to the Second World War. 
The article shows how Prebisch, starting with a very 
orthodox economic theory, was led by the force of events 
to change his ideas and adopt alternative views. It is clear 
that he did incorporate and develop elements of what 
would be Keynesian theory, adapted to the context of 
peripheral countries.
The paper is structured as follows. Section II presents 
Prebisch’s categorization of the Argentine cycle and 
examines his thinking about the initiating factors of the 
cycle, the change from boom (expansionary phase) to bust 
(contractionary phase) conditions and the transmission 
mechanism in both phases. Section III centres on 
Prebisch’s views on the foreign trade multiplier and its 
role in the business cycle, emphasizing the importance 
of monetary factors in the functioning of the multiplier. 
Sections IV and V analyse Prebisch’s changing views 
on monetary policy during the cycle and, in particular, 
those pertaining to policy autonomy, which led to the 
development of his dynamic growth theory (unfinished) 
and the policy advice that made him famous worldwide. 
II
Prebisch’s views on the  
Argentine business cycle
According to Prebisch, boom and bust cycles were a 
pervasive feature of Argentina’s economic history. In 
the writings examined in this paper, covering the period 
from 1820 to 1944, he identified and analysed, albeit not 
with the same depth and detail, eight business cycles, 
the majority of which took place under a convertibility 
regime.4 As did other economists at the time, Prebisch 
perceived cycles as recurrent and inevitable facts of 
economic life, or more precisely as “natural” economic 
4 See Cortés Conde (2001), Gurrieri (2001), Mallorquín (2006; 
2007) and O’Connell (2001) for different analyses of Prebisch’s 
thinking on business cycles and monetary issues. According to our 
analysis, Prebisch’s cycles include 1820 to 1826; 1867 to 1880; 1881 
to 1885; 1886 to 1891; 1899 (1903) to 1914; 1927 to 1933; 1935 to 
1937; and 1939-1944. See Pérez Caldentey and Vernengo (2011) for 
a fuller treatment.
phenomena. Cycles were by definition generic, with 
symmetrical and necessarily continuing upward and 
downward phases and independent of historical time and 
space. Moreover, the intensity of the bust (downward 
phase) was dependent on the excesses of the boom 
(upward phase).5
The regularity of their occurrence and movement, 
and their lack of specificity and historical contingency, 
held sway in Prebisch’s thinking even until the start of 
the Great Depression (Prebisch, 1991, vol. 1, p. 618). 
5 This view is made explicit in Pareto (1896-1897), with which 
Prebisch was familiar (Fernández López, 2002). Pareto (1896-1897) 
also believed that the term “crisis” should apply to both the boom and 
the bust (expansion and contraction), that is to the complete cycle; 
Prebisch was in agreement (1991, vol. 1, p. 118, note 54).
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Cycles, their phases and their turning points were mainly 
driven by external factors including the conditions in 
international liquidity and financial markets. While 
throughout his writings he presents examples of the 
effects of internal monetary expansion on the economy, 
he did not believe that the cycle was generated by 
domestic factors. As he put it (Prebisch, 1991, vol. 3): 
“I have not observed, neither in the cycles I have seen 
closely nor in those that I have studied in our history, 
the existence of domestic elements with the sufficient 
force to promote, by itself, our wave motion.”
Up until the time of the Great Depression, Prebisch 
gave predominance to “changes in the flow of money” 
as the main cause of business cycle fluctuations. At first 
he placed the emphasis on financial flows, determined 
on the demand side by Argentina’s financing needs and 
on the supply side by the liquidity stance of developed 
countries (the United Kingdom and the United States), 
as the triggering factor leading to a subsequent expansion 
of liquidity, prices and the improvement in business 
outlook and conditions. In so doing, he underscored what 
he termed to be the “subjective factors” of the cycle, 
such as speculation, business expectations, euphoria 
and contagion, as important factors in maintaining the 
momentum of the boom (expansionary phase) very 
much in line with a Kindleberger and Aliber (1991) 
type explanation “avant la lettre.”6 
During this time, Prebisch tenaciously held on to a 
monetary theory of the trade cycle throughout his writings, 
conceptually articulated around the quantity theory of 
money and the circulation velocity of money. These 
concepts were, in fact, also used to explain the cycle in 
the more developed countries. In this regard, besides the 
influence of Argentine figures such as Norberto Piñero 
and Juan B. Justo, or Luis Roque Gondra, Prebisch’s 
cycle analysis bore the visible and obvious stamp of 
Irving Fisher, Ralph Hawtrey, Frank Taussig, Vilfredo 
Pareto and Clément Juglar.7
Prebisch came to the realization that, besides monetary 
and financial flows, changes in the conditions that affected 
export performance could also act as initiating factors of 
the economic cycle. But he introduced export performance 
6 Also note that at the time Prebisch distinguished between the 
objective and subjective elements of the cycle. Expectations were 
part and parcel of the explanation of the trade cycle in Cambridge 
(England). One year after Prebisch wrote his Annotations of our own 
circulating medium (1921), Lavington published the first edition of 
his trade cycle, where confidence, anticipations and contagion played 
an essential role. 
7 By 1921, when he wrote his Annotations of our own circulating 
medium, Prebisch was well acquainted with the North American and 
European economic literature on the cycle.
as a triggering cause of economic fluctuations in the cycle 
as he became aware that agricultural prices had been 
trending down since the middle of the 1920s and that the 
Great Depression sharply aggravated this contraction.
Available data presented by Prebisch for 1900-1933 
shows that the agricultural price trend rose between 1900 
and 1925 (5% yearly average) and thereafter declined 
(falling by 7% on average between 1925 and 1933). 
The decline was steeper following the start of the Great 
Depression. In fact, Prebisch argued that the contraction 
was so sharp that around 1933 the agricultural price 
index reached levels that it had not witnessed since the 
nineteenth century. The comparison with the situation 
in industrialized countries whose manufacturing export 
prices had not decreased and in some cases had actually 
risen inevitably led to terms-of-trade considerations 
(Prebisch, 1991, vol. 2, pp. 188-191), most likely providing 
an antecedent to the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis more 
concerned with the cyclical terms-of-trade downturns 
than with the secular trend.8
Thus by the early 1930s the fluctuations in the 
economic cycle were seen as dependent on both the 
conditions in international monetary markets and export 
performance, as well as specific structural features. 
Prebisch explains it in the following way in an article 
entitled “The Economic State” (1930) (Prebisch, 1991, 
vol. 1, p. 634): “Recently, we referred to the predominating 
influence on our monetary cycle of the events in the 
international money market in New York, as used to 
happen before the war with that of London. It is now 
helpful to point out the consequences… for variations 
in foreign purchasing power.”9
8  Prebisch (1991, vol. 2, p. 191) quotes from the League of Nations 
(1932-1933) World Economic Survey and illustrates how structural 
features affect the export and internal performance of countries by 
making the point that in those years the purchasing power (terms of 
trade) of agricultural countries declined while that of industrialized 
countries increased due to a relatively greater fall in the latter’s 
import prices compared with their export prices. Data presented for 
five industrialized countries (France, Germany, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom and United States) show that all managed to improve their 
terms of trade between 1929 and 1933 (by 16%, 45%, 12%, 20% and 
33% respectively). By contrast, data for five agricultural countries 
(Argentina, Australia, Canada, Denmark and New Zealand) for 
1929-1931 show a worsening of the terms of trade (by 32%, 35%, 
10%, 16%, and 38%, respectively). The Prebisch-Singer hypothesis 
refers to a secular decline in developing countries’ terms of trade with 
industrialized countries. The hypothesis was put forward by Prebisch 
and Singer independently in 1950. See Prebisch (1993, vol. 4), Singer 
(1950 and 1987), Palma (1987). 
9  Prebisch similarly argues (ibid. p. 201): “It is a well known fact that 
that the movements of our external trade constitute the decisive factor 
in the great changes of the Argentine economic situation. We are linked 
in a very straight manner with the international economy and exposed 
to all of its changes. When the world market increases its absorption 
11
POrTrAiT OF THE ECONOmiST AS A YOUNG mAN: rAúL PrEBiSCH’S EvOLviNG viEwS ON THE BUSiNESS  
CyCLE And monEy, 1919-1949  •  EstEbAn PéREz CALdEntEy And mAtíAs VERnEngo
C E P A L  R E V I E W  1 0 6  •  A P R I L  2 0 1 2
For Prebisch, the boom (expansionary phase) was 
“naturally” and unavoidably followed by a bust (downward 
phase). And in this sense the point of inflection from 
boom (expansion) to bust (contraction) was bound to 
occur. Moreover, the depth of the latter maintained a 
direct relationship with the intensity of the former. The 
greater the excesses of the boom (expansion) the more 
drastic would be the bust (contraction). At the same time, 
the bust (contraction) was not only unavoidable but in fact 
necessary to prepare the stage for the next upward phase.
Coherently with this view, until Prebisch became 
convinced that a central monetary authority possessed 
the tools to attenuate the cycle phases (see section IV on 
“Money, the cycle and economic policy”), he thought that 
attempts to avoid the contractionary phase of the cycle 
(and more specifically a bust) could only have temporary 
effects and were in fact ultimately useless in a process 
that was necessary to restore external equilibrium–a sine 
qua non condition for internal equilibrium. Moreover, 
by postponing what is viewed as a natural process, these 
measures are ultimately seen as artifices that tend to 
aggravate the required correcting forces. 
For Prebisch, the turning point and triggering 
factor of the bust (contraction) is the same for all cycles 
considered, namely an unsustainable external position 
and, more precisely, an unsustainable current account 
deficit. This position is brought about by a combination 
of three factors or the presence of one of them: rising 
imports, higher debt service obligations and lower 
financial flows. The weight attributed to each of these 
factors depends on the specific cycle under consideration.
As with his analysis of the initiating factors of 
the cycle, Prebisch was aware of and understood the 
importance of external conditions in influencing the 
change from boom (expansion) to bust (contraction), 
and in particular that of international financial markets, 
which tended to behave procyclically.10 After recognizing 
of our products…the purchasing power of the population increases 
immediately; first in rural production … propagating throughout our 
domestic economy and translating into a more active demand for 
merchandises, both foreign and domestically made.” 
10  Curiously enough, while Prebisch recognized the importance of 
external conditions in the initiation of the cycle he did not always 
attribute the same significance to their role in the bust. As an example, 
when analysing the factors that led to the bust (contraction) in the 
1867-1876 cycle he states (Prebisch, 1991, vol. 1, pp.199-120): “A 
goodly part of the gold had been exported in payment of public debts, 
dividends of firms with foreign capital… etc.; in other words, the 
liabilities of the loan balance grew. It also not unsafe to say that the 
asset side of this balance declined due to the tension in the European 
monetary markets in 1873 resulting from the continental panic that 
began in Vienna; this tension must have made it difficult to recruit 
new loans in the European financial markets.”
how economic structure shapes external and domestic 
performance, Prebisch gave paramount importance to 
external conditions and argued in 1944 that the Argentine 
cycle is a mirror of the international monetary cycle 
(Prebisch, 1991, vol. 3, pp. 321-322). Nonetheless, until 
that time he argued that the appropriate management of 
internal conditions, especially prudence in the conduct 
of economic policy during the boom (expansion), could 
substantially attenuate the impact of external “shocks” 
on domestic activity.11
In consonance with his understanding that the 
boom (expansion) and bust (contraction) are symmetric 
phases of the same process, Prebisch argued that the 
same forces pushing economic activity in the boom 
(expansion) would act in the opposite direction in the 
bust (contraction). 
Initially he labelled the effects of the bust 
(contraction) as natural and healthy and as a cleansing 
of the bad elements as did some of the prominent 
economists of the time, such as Schumpeter (see, for 
example, Prebisch, 1991, vol. 2, p. 601 and footnote 
13 below). As he put it in the early 1920s with regard 
to one of the cycles he analysed (Prebisch, 1991, 
vol. 1, p. 171): “With the beginning of the first outflows 
of metallic currency and consequently of the rarefaction 
of money [bills] in circulation, lack of confidence abounds 
and banks restrain their credit. The more imprudent the 
previous policy is the more intense the restriction will 
be”. This monetary reaction is particularly harsh on 
speculators and those that have abused the easiness of 
credit conditions. Furthermore, while it affected “true and 
sound” businesses, these managed to weather the storm 
and remain in business. All in all, this was, according 
to Prebisch, the logical reverse, a natural and healthy 
reaction to a previous false and artificial prosperity.
However, by the end of the 1920s he eventually 
came to recognize the painful and protracted effects 
of adjustment and deflation on economic activity.12 
11  In this regard he writes (Prebisch, 1991, vol. 1, p. 554): “If we had 
administered the increase in metallic reserves prudently, the export of 
gold provoked by high foreign interest rates would have caused only a 
mild dip in the prosperity of our commerce. But if it were employed 
generously in the expansion of money and credit without forestalling 
speculative excesses, the outflows of gold would have set off a more 
or less severe crisis.”
12 The negative effects of deflation were also highlighted by Silvio 
Gesell (1862-1930), a German economist who resided in Argentina 
from 1886 to 1900. Referring to the specific period of the end of the 
nineteenth century in Argentina, Gesell stated: “The increase in the 
value of money is the common cause for all the country’s economic 
troubles” (Gesell, 1898). Keynes, in his Tract on Monetary Reform 
(1923) also pointed out the negative effects of deflation. Finally, it is 
to be noted that these were highlighted by the early Chicago School 
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This resulted to a great extent from the existence of 
imperfections and, in particular, contracts fixed in 
money terms, rigid and fixed costs such as wages and, 
in general, production costs. Deflation as well swelled 
the debt burden (Prebisch, 1991, vol. 1, pp. 59-60, also 
p. 135). These arguments formed the basis on which 
to question the benefits of “liquidation” during the 
downward phase of the cycle.13
The relationship between liquidity and prices, and 
economic expansion and imports in the boom (upward 
phase) and the bust (downward phase), was mediated 
not only by the capacity of the banking system to expand 
and contract its credit base but also by the behaviour of 
the circulation velocity of money and the propensity to 
import. The circulation velocity of money was partly 
driven by expectations encapsulated in what Prebisch 
termed “the subjective factors.”
These included, in the case of the boom (expansionary 
phase): “The appreciation of the opportunities offered by 
of Economics in terms similar to those of Prebisch at this stage of 
his thinking (that is in terms of nominal price and wage rigidities) 
and became the basis for recommending reflationary policies (e.g. 
Simons, 1934).
13  See also “Scholastic Inflation and Argentinean Currency” (Prebisch, 
1991, vols. 2 and 3, pp. 336-350). “Liquidation” was one the phases 
of the cycle identified by Juglar (1860) that became associated with 
the Austrian business cycle theory (see, for example, Schumpeter, 
1989; Hayek, 1933) and with passive policies adopted by the Federal 
Reserve and the Herbert Hoover administration that deepened the Great 
Depression (see White, 2010 for a contrary opinion). Eichengreen 
(1999) defines it as “liquidationism, according to which business cycle 
downturns served the Darwinian function of weeding out the weak 
enterprises least well adapted to a dynamic economy.” As can be seen, 
Prebisch understood liquidation and its effect in a very modern sense. 
Argentina and of the probabilities of rapid enrichment…
stimulated the governing class…to contract European 
money…It’s something subjective, the confidence 
that…permits and accelerates the development of an 
ascending phase; thanks to it [confidence], businesses 
expand on the basis of credit and financial fantasy 
takes flight” (Prebisch, 1991, vol. 1, p. 161). In the 
bust (downward phase) during which the contraction 
in credit produces the collapse of economic activity, 
“the resulting insecurity, depression and mistrust keep 
businesses stagnant until the remembrance of tragic 
epochs becomes blurred and reborn confidence opens the 
way for a new cycle” (Prebisch, 1991, vol. 1, p. 162).14
As Prebisch became more concerned with the balance 
of trade and, more precisely, exports as an initiating factor 
of the cycle, the analysis of the transmission mechanism 
focused in more detail on the linkage and pass-through 
between economic performance and exports and imports. 
He argued that exports and imports “vary correlatively,” 
that is, a persistent upwards/downward movement in 
either imports (exports) tends to be accompanied by a 
movement in the same direction of exports (imports). 
Credit conditions, the circulation velocity of money and 
the propensity to import determined the pass-through 
(Prebisch, 1991, vol. 3, pp. 336-343).
14  Again it is to be noted that Prebisch’s depiction bears resemblance 
to Kindleberger’s (1978) cycle of manias and panics that is triggered 
by “procyclical changes in the supply of credit” leading to a boom 
(expansion) and a process of euphoria, overtrading, and speculation 
(manias). Eventually, there follows a period of financial distress, 
revulsion, panic and crash. Both Prebisch and Kindleberger emphasize 
the recurring character of manias and panics.
13
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Prebisch developed his analysis of the pass-through 
between export receipts, domestic activity and imports by 
introducing a concept (circa 1935) termed the “coefficient 
of expansion” (Prebisch, 1991, vol. 3, pp. 249-298; 
301-310; 335-342; 349-370) or, in better known terms, 
as the foreign trade multiplier.15 According to Prebisch, 
the coefficient of expansion measured the intensity 
with which an increment in incomes, resulting from a 
given increase in exports or financial flows, produces an 
expansion of greater amplitude in domestic economic 
activity. His analysis of the foreign trade multiplier 
was a static one, an explanation of a change from one 
position of equilibrium to another. 
Beginning with a position of full equilibrium, he 
explains the workings of a one-time increase in exports 
in the following way (Prebisch, vol. 3, p. 250):
“If for example, the volume of Argentine exports 
increases–either due to an increase in exports or to 
a rise in prices–the agricultural sector will receive 
correlatively higher incomes allowing it to increase 
its demand for goods and services produced by other 
sectors and also for imported goods. There will be 
higher demand for industrial goods, more commerce 
activity and in transportation, greater utilization of 
professional services and greater imports. At the 
same time, these sectors, which will have received 
more income, will increase their demand for goods 
and services produced within the same sector and 
in other sectors; in this way the influence or effect 
of the initial growth in agricultural sector income 
thanks to rising exports will successively expand.” 
Eventually the system will return to equilibrium 
when the rise in domestic incomes brought about by the 
expansion in exports leaks out through a greater volume 
of imports and other payments to the rest of the world.
In the examples provided by Prebisch, incomes 
are fully spent domestically or externally through 
imports. As a result, the marginal propensity to save (s) 
is ultimately equal to zero and the effect of a change of 
exports (X) on expenditure (Y) is reduced to the inverse 
15  See also Fernández-López (1996).
of the marginal propensity to import (m) or to the foreign 
trade multiplier. Hence, the increase in income is thus 
determined by the rise in exports times the foreign trade 
multiplier. Formally,
 k = 1/(1-c+m) ⇔ k = 1/(s+m) with s = 1-c;
 given s = 0 ⇒ k = 1/m  (1)
Where,
k = multiplier.
c = marginal propensity to consume.
The use of equation (1) to determine the increase 
in income brought about by an autonomous change in 
exports yields, 
 ΔY= 1/m ΔX ⇔ (ΔY/ ΔX ) = 1/m (2)
Besides the import propensity to consume, Prebisch 
identified the circulation velocity of money (“the number 
of times money changes hands”) as the other limiting 
factor to the potency of the “coefficient of expansion.” 
This led him to distinguish his “coefficient of expansion” 
from Keynes’s “multiplier” as set out in Keynes’s 
General Theory.16 
Prebisch saw the multiplier effect as being explained 
by Keynes only for a closed economy with marginal 
references to the import propensity, with no reference to 
the circulation velocity of money, and limited mainly in 
its effects by the savings propensity, “which constrains 
the expansion of economic activity and conspires against 
the full employment of resources” (Prebisch, 1991, 
vol. 3, p. 359). Moreover, Prebisch also criticized the 
multiplier and the associated savings-investment process 
on the basis of their being a timeless representation of 
capitalist economies (Prebisch, 1993, vol. 4, p. 277) with 
little relevance for developing economies.17
16  John Maurice Clark also emphasized the importance of monetary 
circulation for the working of the multiplier process (Fiorito and 
Vernengo, 2009).
17  Throughout 1949 Prebisch still maintained that savings determined 
investment and that one of the major problems of developing economies 
such as Argentina was the lack of savings. See Prebisch, 1991, vol. 3, 
pp. 361 and 367.
III
The coefficient of expansion and the  
foreign trade multiplier
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In the General Theory, Keynes was mainly concerned 
with an entrepreneur economy and with the process 
of decision-making under uncertainty. In this sense 
the multiplier analysis appears in fact in a superficial 
and perhaps incomplete form (e.g. Kahn, 1984; Chick, 
1997). Nonetheless, he was well aware of the effects of 
the propensity to import on the multiplier as illustrated 
by the reasoning underlying his estimate of the United 
Kingdom’s multiplier and the comparison with that of 
the United States (Keynes, 1936).18
This follows from the fact that the propensity to 
import was part of the framework and, indeed, logic 
with which the multiplier was conceived (Kahn, 1972). 
Imports along with savings and “the non-transfer portion 
of the income of the unemployed,” was considered a 
leakage, and leakages ensured that the multiplier could 
be expressed as an infinite but converging geometrical 
series. Accordingly, Keynes’s The Means to Prosperity 
(1933), published three years prior to the General Theory, 
which deals with an open economy, fully incorporates 
the propensity to import as part of the multiplier analysis 
presented. Moreover, treatments of the foreign trade 
multiplier could be found in several authors of the time 
including Giblin (1930), Warming (1932), Kalecki (1933) 
and Harrod (1933). By 1941, roughly three years prior 
to Prebisch’s full treatment of the export expansion 
18 Keynes’s writings denote an important concern with the external 
sector; in fact, in the General Theory he argued that the lack of concern 
with the external position of a country was a by-product of laissez-
faire. As he put it (Keynes, 1936, p. 339): “The weight of my criticism 
is directed against the inadequacy of the theoretical foundations of 
the laissez-faire doctrine upon which I was brought up... against the 
notion that the rate of interest and the volume of investment are self-
adjusting at the optimum level, so that preoccupation with the balance 
of trade is a waste of time” (Keynes, 1936).
coefficient, the foreign trade multiplier was a well-
established concept in the literature (Haberler, 1945).
As mentioned above, besides the propensity to 
import, Prebisch identified the circulation velocity of 
money as the other key variable absent from Keynes’s 
General Theory multiplier analysis, allowing him to draw 
a distinction between his approach and that of Keynes. 
Prior to the publication of the General Theory, J.M. 
Clark (1935) had made the distinction between “two 
approaches, one via successive cycles of income and 
spending by ultimate recipients of income, the other 
via the volume of money and its velocity of circulation. 
The first has been…developed by…Kahn…and J.M. 
Keynes; the second has, so far as I am aware, not found 
its way into print.”
Following upon J.M. Clark’s distinction, some 
authors have argued that the logic of the multiplier 
implicitly includes assumptions regarding the behaviour 
of the circulation velocity of money and that the analysis 
is incomplete without its explicit incorporation into the 
analysis. Haberler (1945) pointed out that to determine the 
secondary effects of new public expenditure, information 
was needed about the marginal propensity to consume 
and the circulation velocity of money. Machlup (1939) 
argued that the time element is “of great importance” to 
the theory of the multiplier and introduced period analysis 
to work out the primary and secondary effects of public 
works spending, where periods are seen as reciprocals 
of the circulation velocity of money. Prebisch seems 
to hold a similar view as he argues (Prebisch, 1991, 
vol. 3, p. 359) that following an increase in income, 
primary employment will expand but that this will not 
produce an expansion in secondary employment unless 
there is another round of new expenditure or unless the 
circulation velocity of money increases.
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For the most part until 1931, the action of the government 
and the monetary and financial system during the 
upswings and downswings of the Argentine economic 
cycle had been procyclical. This stance was easily 
justifiable since the business cycle was a “natural,” 
recurrent and predictable phenomenon with inevitable 
symmetrical upward and downward phases. Moreover 
as emphasized in an earlier section, avoiding downturns 
through “artificial policy measures” simply made the 
adjustment harsher.
The first policy reactions to the Great Depression 
did not constitute an exception. On the monetary front, 
the prevailing ideas, including those of Prebisch at the 
time, argued in favor of undertaking severe stabilization 
and adjustment measures to put the country, in spite of its 
contractionary effects in the short run, on a ready stand to 
take advantage of the inevitable upcoming recovery. On 
the fiscal front, a similar logic dictated the reduction of 
public salaries and State expenditures and the paralysis 
of public works (Prebisch, 1993, vol. 4, pp. 116-117).19
Since the cycle was bound to occur, the role of 
policy was limited and could at most ensure the orderly 
occurrence of its phases. On the one hand, policy 
could avoid the excesses of the boom (upward phase), 
including the characteristic processes of speculation and 
over-indebtedness, since the greater the excesses of the 
boom (in the upward phase) the harsher the following 
inevitable contraction would be. On the other hand, it 
could mitigate the effects of the downward phase on 
business conditions and real activity.20 
A necessary condition to allow policy to play this 
role was the abandonment of the gold standard, which 
tended to aggravate the amplitude of the phases of the 
cycle, making it more unstable. Prebisch identified three 
key weaknesses of the gold standard. First, its workings 
required the unnecessary contraction of imports at the 
same time as that of internal activities. Second, the 
natural trend for banks was to increase their lending in 
the ascending phase of the cycle, helping heighten the 
19  As Under-Secretary of Finance, Prebisch implemented what he 
himself termed “brutal budget adjustments” including a 15% reduction 
in government wages. See Pollock, Kerner and Love (2002).
20  These types of measures should be distinguished from those aimed 
at unnecessarily prolonging the boom (expansion). See Prebisch, 
1991, vol. 1, p.123.
amplitude of the boom (expansionary) phase and the 
contraction in the downward phase. Third, the stability 
of the exchange rates under a gold standard regime 
helped stimulate rapid silver capital inflows, aggravating 
the phases of the economic cycle (Prebisch, 1991, vol. 
3, pp. 233-242; vol. 2, pp. 565-575; vol. 4, p.141). 
Linked to these criticisms was the argument that metallic 
currency regimes such as the Caisse de Conversion were 
“fair weather boards”, giving an appearance of smooth 
functioning in good times as capital flowed in, yet 
requiring violent deflations in bad times when capital 
flowed out (Prebisch, 1991, vol. 3, p.4 and vol. 1).
The abandonment of the gold standard in Argentina 
in 1929 introduced the possibility of tinkering with 
discretionary policy measures to smooth out the 
fluctuations of the economic cycle. However, these 
measures did not have their intended consequences as 
they increased the instability and flimsy foundations 
of the current conditions. It would become obvious 
that managing, to the extent possible, the fluctuations 
of the economic cycle required a strong, central and 
independent monetary authority.
At first, to avoid depreciation of the currency, the 
government decided to export significant quantities of 
gold, reducing its supply and thus raising the foreign 
exchange price of the currency. The effect of the reduction 
of domestic gold supply on money supply, credit and, 
in general, liquidity conditions forced the introduction 
of the rediscount (Prebisch, 1991, vol. 3, pp. 4 and 89; 
1993, vol. 4. p. 138).
The idea of using the rediscount was actually 
devised but not implemented in 1914 (Prebisch, 1991, 
vol. 1, p. 173). In April 1931 Prebisch suggested its 
use with the aim of restoring banks’ liquidity to pursue 
their day-to-day operations and meet their immediate 
obligations, avoiding recourse to a brisk credit contraction 
and avoiding a financial crash. The rediscount was not 
created to be used to stimulate new business or expand 
existing ones and certainly not to spur or facilitate long-
term investment (Prebisch, 1991, vol. 2, p. 2., vol. 3, 
p. 89 and 1993, vol. 4, pp. 118-119).
The use of the rediscount was followed by the 
imposition of exchange controls to allay fears of further 
exchange rate depreciation due to the United Kingdom’s 
departure from the gold standard regime in October 
1931(Prebisch, 1991, vol. 2, pp. 4-6). The imposition of 
IV
money, the cycle and economic policy
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exchange controls lasted from October 1931 until late 
1933 and fixed the value of the peso at an artificially 
high value. The consequences were to prolong the 
external imbalance and the decline in agriculture and 
industrial prices thus aggravating the effects of the 
Great Depression, including growing unemployment 
and expanding debt. The measures also provided the 
incentives for the creation of a foreign exchange black 
market (Prebisch, 1991, vol. 3, pp. 16-17).
Eventually, the pernicious unintended effects of 
these measures led to a change in the monetary stance 
in 1933, consisting of exchange rate devaluation coupled 
with the establishment of a dual exchange rate system 
comprising an official, market-based exchange rate 
(affecting the export of traditional products) and the 
imposition of import permits.21
Prebisch would later sustain that foreign exchange 
and import controls had been successful in helping to 
restore the external equilibrium in 1933. He passed a 
similar judgment on similar measures applied in 1937 
and in the period running from 1938 to 1940, also 
stating that these measures provided a way to stimulate 
domestic industry (Prebisch, 1993, vol. 4, p. 194). This 
experience, coupled with the analysis of the foreign trade 
multiplier (see equation (2) above) probably constituted 
important steps leading towards his proposal of reducing 
the “import coefficient” as one of key pillars of his later 
policy proposal to achieve “general economic growth” 
(Prebisch, 1993, vol. 4, pp. 207-215).
Prebisch argued that the use of discretionary 
measures such as the rediscount (notwithstanding its 
lack of success) and exchange controls paved the way 
for the creation of the central bank, although he claims 
that he had seen the need to create a central monetary 
 
21  From Prebisch’s point of view, during this period Argentina undertook 
the first attempts, albeit tepid and temporary, at countercyclical 
policy. These consisted of sustaining the price of agricultural goods 
through government purchases, and the undertaking of public works. 
No doubt the influence of J.M. Keynes’s The Means to Prosperity, 
which Prebisch had read in 1933, was paramount in the design of 
these measures (Prebisch, 1991, vol. 2, p. 146). In his interview with 
Prebisch in 1983, Julio González del Solar (Mallorquin, 2006) terms 
the use of the rediscount and the creation of the Commission for 
Foreign Exchange Control in 1931 as the first two heterodox steps in 
Prebisch’s thinking. However, as explained above, the rediscount was 
an old idea and Prebisch himself considered it an orthodox instrument. 
He viewed exchange controls as somewhat of a departure from the 
mainstream doctrine (Prebisch, 1991, vol. 3, p. 89). See also, Prebisch 
(1984). Curiously, later on (in 1946), he claimed to be in disagreement 
and “abominate”’ restrictions, including exchange rate controls, but 
justified their use on the grounds that developing countries did not 
possess alternative instruments to confront and mitigate the effects of 
the business cycle (see Prebisch, 1993, vol. 4, p. 226).
authority before the First World War. As he puts it 
(Prebisch, 1991, vol. 1, p. 7):
“When I was at the Banco de la Nación as Director 
of Economic Research, I realized that the Caisse de 
Conversion did not work, that it worked when gold 
flowed into the country and ceased to work when gold 
flowed out of the country, and that a fundamental 
reform was necessary. This was before the great 
crisis. I began to consider the idea of creating an 
Argentine central bank. When the crisis came it 
was necessary to take emergency measures, and 
that convinced me even more that a central bank 
was necessary; that the rediscount could not be 
applied without first having an organization; that it 
was necessary to combine it with a series of other 
instruments; and that was the central bank.” 
The Central Bank of Argentina was created in 1935. 
The project for the bank was drafted by Prebisch himself 
in 1934 at the request of Minister of Finance Federico 
Pinedo.22 It was conceived as an institution independent 
of the government (“It is not conceivable that a central 
bank be managed by governments”)23 permitting a more 
rational distribution of monetary functions and more 
efficient management of reserves, whose main objective 
was monetary stability, along conventional lines.
Prebisch thought that the central bank had a role 
to play in cushioning the effects of economic cycles, 
although he it found illusory to think that it could offset 
the movements of the cycle. As he put it: (Prebisch, 1991, 
vol. 2, p. 64) “To expect that fluctuations in the country’s 
economic activity can be offset by the excellence of a 
monetary system would be to fall into the same illusion 
harboured by many economists in the United States 
with respect to the Federal Reserve, prior…to the…
collapse. But it cannot be doubted that the amplitude of 
those movements could be cushioned by an efficiently 
run central bank.”24
It is important to understand that the reason for 
cushioning business cycle fluctuations was not to maintain 
domestic output stability but rather to maintain price 
and currency stability. It is in this sense that the lean-
against-the-wind monetary policy was, in essence, of 
an orthodox nature (see Prebisch, 1991, vol. 3, p. 90).
22  He had been commended with the same task earlier (in 1931) by 
the then minister of finance Enrique Uriburu. See Prebisch, 1991, 
vol. 2, pp. 7 and 351.
23  The independence of the central banks was seen by Prebisch as a 
protection against the temptation to inflate the currency due to fiscal 
imbalances (Prebisch, 1991,vol. 2, p. 363).
24  See also Prebisch, 1991, p.358 for a similar statement and pp. 664-665.
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This lean-against-the-wind monetary policy was 
reflected in one of the key objectives of the central 
bank as set out in Prebisch’s 1934 project: to ensure an 
adequate level of reserve accumulation as a precautionary 
motive of building buffer stocks to confront export shocks 
and sudden capital stops. As he put it (Prebisch, 1991, 
vol. 2, pp. 610-111): “The ascending movements are, 
in general, of a limited duration. The opportunity to 
repair the consequences of past wrongs and accumulate 
reserves for difficult times, whose return it is prudent to 
expect, should then not be wasted.”
The first article of the draft proposal for the 
creation of a central bank in Argentina dealing with its 
functions stated: “The Bank will have as an objective: 
(a) The concentration of sufficient reserves to moderate 
the consequences of fluctuations in exports and foreign 
capital investments on money, credit and commercial 
activities, in order to maintain the value of money” 
(Prebisch, 1991, vol. 2, p. 383).25
Following the creation of the central bank, the 
Argentine economy experienced an expansion in 
economic activity lasting until 1937. During this time 
the central bank, in line with the orthodox spirit of its 
creation, used open-market operations, interventions in 
the foreign exchange market and moral suasion to avoid 
an over-expansion and overheating of the economy (see 
Prebisch, 1991, pp. 64 and 359, and pp. 610-622; and 
vol. 3, pp. 88-119).
However, the force of events prompted by the 
beginning of the downward phase of the cycle in 1937 
led the bank to progressively evolve into a less orthodox 
institution whose goal became more ambitious than just 
“cushioning” the phases of the business cycle to ensure 
their orderly occurrence and maintain the stability of 
money. The central bank became aware that it had a double 
objective (real and nominal price and output stability) 
and that the balance of payments was central for both.
Initially, in 1937 “the central bank…was predisposed 
to consider this contraction of domestic economic 
activity as a logical and natural event, indispensable 
to reduce imports and establish balance of payments 
equilibrium” (Prebisch, 1991, vol. 3, pp. 101-102). Yet, 
25  In his International Currency Experience: Lessons of the Inter-war 
Period (Nurske, 1944), Nurske thought highly successful the policy 
of neutralization, mainly international reserve accumulation, pursued 
by the Argentine central bank under Prebisch’s direction. Triffin also 
entertained a similar opinion and praised non-orthodox instruments 
such as foreign exchange controls. Following a similar line of thought, 
in 1945, Prebisch helped to draft the legislation for the newly created 
Central Bank of Paraguay and the reform of the existing system of 
foreign exchange controls. See Helleiner (2009).
as the contractionary effects wreaked havoc, the central 
bank decided to change and stabilize domestic activity. 
According to the 1938 Central Bank Report (Prebisch, 
1991, vol. 3, p. 104):
“… monetary policy can propose two objectives in 
the face of the economic cycle. The first consists of 
keeping the expansion of credit from heightening the 
intensity of the waves… The second objective goes 
further. It is not limited to avoiding the heightening 
of these fluctuations, but it also seeks to limit their 
amplitude and reduce the intensity of the variation 
of purchasing power during the cycle, in order to 
attenuate the consequences of such variations on 
the volume of domestic economic activity.”
The need for countercyclical action resurfaced soon 
after the start of the Second World War, as Argentina 
was faced with a growing external imbalance and 
the “perception of decline in business activity and, 
in particular, in the construction sector” leading to a 
fear of general economic prostration (Prebisch, 1993, 
vol. 4, pp. 156-157). The plan for countercyclical action 
(the Plan for National Reactivation) contemplated an 
expansionary monetary policy coupled with exchange 
rate controls. More specifically, the plan sought to 
purchase agricultural surpluses to avoid price declines, 
increase construction activity and promote the financing 
of industrial development. 
Within the logic of the plan, fiscal policy played 
mainly a supporting role by creating the required 
conditions, incentives and space for private activity to 
flourish. The details of the plan, which also argue for 
the necessity of circumscribing the intervention of the 
State, are reminiscent of the “crowding-out” argument 
highlighting how attached the Argentine authorities 
remained to orthodox economic thinking.
The Plan for National Reactivation was never 
approved. The force of political and external events, 
in particular the United States war effort that led to an 
increase in domestic demand and imports, superseded it. 
As put by Prebisch (Prebisch, 1993, vol. 4. p. 160): “The 
United States, which in 1940 had been virtually absent 
from the market for certain Argentine products, starts 
to purchase very actively. This soothes our balance-of-
payments concerns, allows a more flexible distribution 
of foreign exchange, increases domestic purchasing 
power and rapidly changes the context of the situation.”
The change in external conditions led to the 
suppression of import permits and the flexibilization of 
the exchange rate regime, even though a dual exchange 
rate remained in place. It is also important to note that in 
1943 the central bank imposed capital controls to deter 
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Prebisch viewed the change in external conditions after 
the start of the Second World War and its effects on 
Argentina as a validation of his business cycle approach. 
The business cycle and its phases was a recurrent and 
natural phenomenon. The phases were related, and the 
more exaggerated the boom (expansionary) phase the 
sharper the contraction would be. The change from 
boom (expansionary) to bust (contractionary) conditions 
occurred rapidly and unpredictably, requiring flexibility 
in economic policy and, more important, moderation 
and prudence and an active policy of neutralization.27
While he did recommend avoiding excessive fiscal 
spending and lax monetary policies, and increased savings 
during the boom (expansion) to face and weather the 
inevitable contraction to follow, he argued that a country 
like Argentina should not be forced to forego higher 
growth and improved material well-being during the 
upward phase of the cycle, only to face the consequences 
of a downturn.
He ultimately recommended shielding the domestic 
economy from ups and downs by substituting domestic 
industry and production for foreign imports. This was a 
basis for arguing for the promotion and development of 
domestic industry and the expansion of internal activity.
27 As he explains: “We are exposed, in our country, to rapid and 
unpredictable changes in the economic situation. We skip from 
gloomy pessimism, as in 1940, to the opposite …It suffices to reflect 
on what would have happened if the plan for construction [under 
the National Plan for Reactivation] had been launched and if the 
resulting purchasing power had been coupled with new purchasing 
power derived from the increase in exports: circulation would have 
expanded excessively, with the pernicious consequences that always 
follow” (1993, vol. 4, p. 160).
These ideas were already embedded in his book 
proposal Money and Economic Activity on which he 
began working in 1943, the year in which as a result 
of a military coup marking the eventual ascendancy of 
Peronism, Prebisch lost his post in the administration, 
including his central bank appointment, that had been 
essential for the development of his ideas since the 
early 1930s.28
In Money and Economic Activity, Prebisch argued 
that monetary and financial policy should have three 
main aims: (i) attenuate the impact of abrupt changes in 
harvest conditions, fluctuations and external contingencies; 
(ii) create the monetary conditions that stimulate the 
development and maintenance of full employment of the 
workforce; (iii) foster and support the highest possible 
rate of growth of economic activity.29
28  Following his resignation from the central bank in 1943 and until his 
appointment to the Economic Commission for Latin America (ecla), 
he remained committed to teaching and was also an international 
consultant. According to him, at this time he began rethinking his past 
experiences and developing his periphery-centre and development 
theories. See Pollock, Kerner and Love (2002).
29 As explained above, Prebisch had conceived maintaining stability 
in the value of money as one of the main functions of the central 
bank. Prebisch was aware that inflation and disinflation had important 
economic and social costs. The fact that a low and stable rate of 
inflation is not included as part of the aims of monetary policy in 
his 1943 draft responds to the belief that the central bank should 
expand its objectives and also aim at full employment. Nonetheless, 
maintaining full employment and the highest possible rate of growth 
of output does inevitably lead to situations of inflation and output 
trade-offs. Throughout the period covered in this article, Prebisch 
never abandoned the orthodox belief that inflation is the product of 
fiscal deficits. See, for example, Prebisch, 1993, vol. 4, p. 229.
V
The quest for national policy autonomy  
and the global economic cycle
the inflow of short-term capital and avoid its destabilizing 
effects, and to stimulate foreign direct investment. While 
this countercyclical measure was in force for only three 
months, it is worthwhile to quote Prebisch at length due 
to its current relevance (Prebisch, 1993, vol. 4, p. 183):
“This capital [short-term capital] went to further 
inflate the categories of goods or assets that were 
already inflated and did not translate, except on very 
rare occasions, into a real increase in the country’s 
output… the measures adopted by the government 
allow the central bank to make an exception, to allow 
the inflow of this capital if it is shown that it will 
be used for a real increase in output”.26
26  In Latin America, and elsewhere, proponents of capital controls 
base their case precisely on the argument put forward by Prebisch, that 
is, the change in the composition of financial inflows from short-term 
to long-term investment.
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The success of these policies required an import 
policy and fiscal reform. The import policy consisted 
of “the rational modification of their composition to 
serve certain objectives” rather than their “systematic 
restrictions”. Prebisch thought that a policy of autarky 
was as absurd as a policy of free trade and agreed that 
Argentina should participate to the extent possible in the 
international economy but avoid a “constant subordination 
of the national economy to external movements and 
contingencies.” Accordingly, the country needed to 
“develop inwardly, strengthening its internal structure, 
and achieve an autonomous functioning of its economy.”30 
Prebisch’s defense of national policy autonomy 
eventually took on a regional tone, as he became 
convinced that the Argentine cycle and its features were 
not specific to Argentina but that they were rather the 
manifestations and characteristics of the workings of a 
global process, a universal cycle. In this sense Prebisch 
argued, as mentioned above, that the Argentine cycle was 
a mirror, a reflection, of the international monetary cycle.
The global or universal cycle was triggered by 
developed countries and more specifically by what 
Prebisch termed to be the cyclical centre. The cyclical 
centre referred to the country (perhaps group of countries) 
whose repercussions due to its economic importance were 
transmitted to the rest of the world. In the nineteenth 
century and up until the First World War, the United 
Kingdom held the cyclical centre title, which was taken 
by the United States thereafter. The countries subject 
to the influence of the impulses of the centre–periphery 
included all those in Latin America. As Prebisch put it 
(Prebisch, 1993, vol. 4, p. 224):
“The United States… actively fulfills the role 
of the main cyclical centre, not only within the 
continent but also throughout the world; the Latin 
American countries are in the periphery of the 
economic system….Why do I call the United 
States the cyclical centre? Because the magnitude 
30  See Prebisch (1943, p. 7; and 1993, vol. 4, pp. 209-214). In line 
with the balance-of-payments approach he argued that a country 
like Argentina needed to import in order to export. Had Prebisch 
been aware that in his framework, formalized in part by equation 
(2) above, exports (X) can equal the propensity to export times the 
level of external demand (or income), as in McCombie and Thirlwall 
(1994), he could have been a step away from realizing that a policy 
for general economic growth could be based in part, on the reduction 
in the import coefficient, on an increase in the export coefficient or on 
a combination of both. The reduction in the import coefficient may 
well be conceived alternatively as in an increase in the productivity 
of imports. In many respects the simple numerical example presented 
in section III on “The coefficient of expansion and the foreign trade 
multiplier” prefigures the literature on the balance-of-payments 
constraint to growth.
and economic characteristics of this country are 
such that it is the source of the expansionary and 
contractionary impulses of the economic life of the 
world, particularly in the Latin American periphery, 
whose countries are under the influence of those 
impulses just as they had been before, when the 
United Kingdom was the main cyclical centre.” 31
The universal or global cycle was thus divided 
into two phases with different characteristics, one 
affecting the centre and the other the periphery, that is, 
Latin American countries.32 The cycles in the centre 
and periphery were different due to their structural 
characteristics.33 Moreover, since the periphery faced 
a binding external constraint while the centre did not, 
they faced markedly different restrictions in their use 
of domestic policy space. 
Faced with a contraction of economic activity and 
price declines, the cyclical centre could always resort 
to the use of monetary instruments such as the money 
supply or interest rates without regard for exchange rate 
parity or international reserve adequacy conditions.34 
Contrarily, the periphery, bereft of the use of this privilege 
by the binding character of its external constraint, 
had to turn to the use of exchange rate variations or 
quantitative restrictions and controls (Prebisch, 1993, 
vol. 4. pp. 225-226).
Prebisch also contemplated a policy of reserve 
accumulation by the countries of the periphery. In fact 
he argued, very much in line with his earlier views, that 
the countries of the periphery had “the responsibility” 
to generate the financial resources during the upward 
phase of the cycle (including international reserves) so 
as to face and weather contractions (Prebisch, 1993, 
vol. 4. p. 232).
Prebisch also thought that the White and Keynes 
plans for a new international order had great merit in 
their proposal of a credit system allowing temporary 
alleviations of balance-of-payments imbalances. 
However, according to him, they failed to address the 
31  The centre-periphery cycle dichotomy was a historical and 
evolutionary concept. Not all developed countries belonged to the 
centre. Indeed, Prebisch asked himself whether Canada should be 
part of the periphery or of the centre. Also, besides a main cyclical 
centre, Prebisch introduced the notion of second cyclical centre–a 
role he attributed to the United Kingdom. See Prebisch, 1991, vol. 4, 
pp. 224-231.
32   Prebisch did not develop the different phase characteristics of 
centre and periphery.
33  See also Prebisch, 1991, vol. 3, pp. 319-329.
34  This is remindful of the debate surrounding the policy of quantitative 
easing pursued since 2008 by the Federal Reserve Bank of the United 
States.
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more fundamental problem of creating a balanced and 
equitable trading system.35
As he progressed in his thinking about cycles, 
Prebisch continued to underscore the relevance of a 
general cycle theory but argued that a cycle theory must 
converge towards a more general “dynamic theory.” 
Prebisch understood that the growth process of a capitalist 
economy was that of a growth cycle and that this process 
encompassed the entire spectrum of economic activity. 
In his own words (Prebisch, 1993, vol. 4, p. 414):
“I am more and more convinced that the cycle is the 
way through which a capitalist economy grows. A 
capitalist economy expands only in wave motion, 
35  As he put it (Prebisch, 1943, pp. 8-9): “In spite of their great merits 
they [the Keynes and White plans] do not resolve the fundamental 
problem that depends essentially on the restoration of international 
trade. If the United States does not buy as much from the rest of the 
world as the world buys from the United States, there is no monetary 
system that will resist in the long run.”
and any disruption…can only give rise to a wave 
motion movement. …If the cycle is the way to 
grow…and if the economy moves incessantly in 
this manner, it would seem that all the events of 
the economy together, not only those of production 
and employment, but also those of distribution, 
must be integrated into a general dynamic theory.” 
Prebisch outlined his dynamic economic theory in 
1949, but it remained at the level of a series of lecture and 
conference notes. Nonetheless, it included (albeit at a rough 
stage, apart from the centre-periphery dichotomy and the 
idea that the main constraint to economic expansion in 
the periphery was the balance of payments) the workings 
of technological progress in both development poles, as 
well as other notions and concepts that were key to justify 
State-led industrialization and also regional integration. 
These are central tenets of his manifesto The Economic 
Development of Latin America and its Main Problems 
and of ecla —and later eclac— development thinking.
(Original: English)
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